NCSC-TG-001: Tan book

by The Editor [Published on 16 Oct. 2002 / Last Updated on 24 Jan. 2013]

A Guide to Understanding Audit in Trusted Systems

 
 
 
 
                                              NCSC-TG-001 
                                         Library No. S-228,470 
 
 
 
 
                          FOREWORD 
 
 
 
 
This publication, "A Guide to Understanding Audit in Trusted 
Systems," is being issued by the National Computer Security 
Center (NCSC) under the authority of and in accordance with 
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 5215.1.  The guidelines 
described in this document provide a set of good practices 
related to the use of auditing in automatic data processing 
systems employed for processing classified and other sensitive 
information. Recommendations for revision to this guideline are 
encouraged and will be reviewed biannually by the National 
Computer Security Center through a formal review process.  
Address all proposals for revision through appropriate channels 
to:  
                 
       National Computer Security Center 
       9800 Savage Road 
       Fort George G. Meade, MD  20755-6000  
            
       Attention: Chief, Computer Security Technical Guidelines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
Patrick R. Gallagher, Jr.                     28 July 1987 
Director 
National Computer Security Center  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                   i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
Special recognition is extended to James N. Menendez, National 
Computer Security Center (NCSC), as project manager of the 
preparation and production of this document. 
 
Acknowledgement is also given to the NCSC Product Evaluations 
Team who provided the technical guidance that helped form this 
document and to those members of the computer security community 
who contributed their time and expertise by actively
participating in the review of this document. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   ii 
 
 
 
                          CONTENTS 
 
 
FOREWORD ...................................................  i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...........................................  ii 

CONTENTS ...................................................  iii

PREFACE .....................................................  v 
 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................  1 
 
    1.1 HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER ....  1 
    1.2 GOAL OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER .......  1 
 
2. PURPOSE ..................................................  2 
 
3. SCOPE ....................................................  3 
 
4. CONTROL OBJECTIVES .......................................  4 
 
5. OVERVIEW OF AUDITING PRINCIPLES ..........................  8 
 
    5.1 PURPOSE OF THE AUDIT MECHANISM.......................  8 
    5.2 USERS OF THE AUDIT MECHANISM.........................  8 
    5.3 ASPECTS OF EFFECTIVE AUDITING .......................  9 
 
         5.3.1 Identification/Authentication ................  9 
         5.3.2 Administrative ...............................  10
         5.3.3 System Design ................................  10

    5.4 SECURITY OF THE AUDIT ...............................  10 

6. MEETING THE CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS ........................  12
 
    6.1 THE C2 AUDIT REQUIREMENT ............................  12

         6.1.1 Auditable Events .............................  12
         6.1.2 Auditable Information ........................  12
         6.1.3 Audit Basis ..................................  13

    6.2 THE B1 AUDIT REQUIREMENT ............................  13
 
         6.2.1 Auditable Events .............................  13
         6.2.2 Auditable Information ........................  13
         6.2.3 Audit Basis ..................................  14

                                  iii 
     
 
                          CONTENTS (Continued) 
 
    6.3 THE B2 AUDIT REQUIREMENT ............................  14

         6.3.1 Auditable Events .............................  14
         6.3.2 Auditable Information ........................  14
         6.3.3 Audit Basis ..................................  14

    6.4 THE B3 AUDIT REQUIREMENT ............................  15

         6.4.1 Auditable Events .............................  15
         6.4.2 Auditable Information ........................  15
         6.4.3 Audit Basis ..................................  15

    6.5 THE A1 AUDIT REQUIREMENT ............................  16

         6.5.1 Auditable Events .............................  16
         6.5.2 Auditable Information ........................  16
         6.5.3 Audit Basis ..................................  16 
    
7. POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION METHODS ..........................  17

    7.1 PRE/POST SELECTION OF AUDITABLE EVENTS ..............  17 
 
         7.1.1 Pre-Selection ................................  17
         7.1.2 Post-Selection ...............................  18

    7.2 DATA COMPRESSION ....................................  18
    7.3 MULTIPLE AUDIT TRAILS ...............................  19
    7.4 PHYSICAL STORAGE ....................................  19
    7.5 WRITE-ONCE DEVICE ...................................  20
    7.6 FORWARDING AUDIT DATA ...............................  21

8. OTHER TOPICS .............................................  22

    8.1 AUDIT DATA REDUCTION ................................  22
    8.2 AVAILABILITY OF AUDIT DATA ..........................  22
    8.3 AUDIT DATA RETENTION ................................  22
    8.4 TESTING .............................................  23
    8.5 DOCUMENTATION .......................................  23
    8.6 UNAVOIDABLE SECURITY RISKS ..........................  24

         8.6.1 Auditing Administrators/Insider Threat .......  24 
         8.6.2 Data Loss ....................................  25

9. AUDIT SUMMARY ...........................................  26 

GLOSSARY

REFERENCES ..............................................  27 

 
 
 


 
                          PREFACE                
 
 
 
 
Throughout this guideline there will be recommendations made that
are not included in the Trusted Computer System Evaluation 
Criteria (the Criteria) as requirements.  Any recommendations 
that are not in the Criteria will be prefaced by the word 
"should," whereas all requirements will be prefaced by the word 
"shall."  It is hoped that this will help to avoid any confusion.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   v 
                                                                1

 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   History of the National Computer Security Center 
 
The DoD Computer Security Center (DoDCSC) was established in 
January 1981 for the purpose of expanding on the work started by 
the DoD Security Initiative.  Accordingly, the Director, National
Computer Security Center, has the responsibility for establishing
and publishing standards and guidelines for all areas of computer
security.  In 1985, DoDCSC's name was changed to the National 
Computer Security Center to reflect its responsibility for 
computer security throughout the federal government. 
 
 
1.2   Goal of the National Computer Security Center 
 
The main goal of the National Computer Security Center is to 
encourage the widespread availability of trusted computer 
systems.  In support of that goal a metric was created, the DoD 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (the Criteria), 
against which computer systems could be evaluated for security.  
The Criteria was originally published on 15 August 1983 as CSC- 
STD-001-83.  In December 1985 the DoD adopted it, with a few 
changes, as a DoD Standard, DoD 5200.28-STD.  DoD Directive 
5200.28, "Security Requirements for Automatic Data Processing 
(ADP) Systems" has been written to, among other things, require 
the Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation 
Criteria to be used throughout the DoD.  The Criteria is the 
standard used for evaluating the effectiveness of security 
controls built into ADP systems.  The Criteria is divided into 
four divisions: D, C, B, and A, ordered in a hierarchical manner 
with the highest division (A) being reserved for systems 
providing the best available level of assurance.  Within 
divisions C and B there are a number of subdivisions known as 
classes, which are also ordered in a hierarchical manner to 
represent different levels of security in these classes.   
 
 
2.   PURPOSE 
 
For Criteria classes C2 through A1 the Criteria requires that a 
user's actions be open to scrutiny by means of an audit.  The 
audit process of a secure system is the process of recording, 
examining, and reviewing any or all security-relevant activities 
on the system.  This guideline is intended to discuss issues 
involved in implementing and evaluating an audit mechanism.  The 
purpose of this document is twofold.  It provides guidance to 
manufacturers on how to design and incorporate an effective audit
mechanism into their system, and it provides guidance to 
implementors on how to make effective use of the audit 
                                1



capabilities provided by trusted systems.  This document contains
suggestions as to what information should be recorded on the 
audit trail, how the audit should be conducted, and what 
protective measures should be accorded to the audit resources. 
 
Any examples in this document are not to be construed as the only
implementations that will satisfy the Criteria requirement.  The 
examples are merely suggestions of appropriate implementations.  
The recommendations in this document are also not to be construed
as supplementary requirements to the Criteria. The Criteria is 
the only metric against which systems are to be evaluated.   
 
This guideline is part of an on-going program to provide helpful 
guidance on Criteria issues and the features they address. 
 
 
3.   SCOPE 
 
An important security feature of Criteria classes C2 through A1 
is the ability of the ADP system to audit any or all of the 
activities on the system.  This guideline will discuss auditing 
and the features of audit facilities as they apply to computer 
systems and products that are being built with the intention of 
meeting the requirements of the Criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                2 
 
 
 
4.  CONTROL OBJECTIVES
 
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria gives the 
following as the Accountability Control Objective: 
 
    "Systems that are used to process or handle classified or 
     other sensitive information must assure individual          
     accountability whenever either a mandatory or               
     discretionary security policy is invoked.  Furthermore, to  
     assure accountability the capability must exist for an 
     authorized and competent agent to access and evaluate       
     accountability information by a secure means, within a      
     reasonable amount of time and without undue difficulty."(1) 
 
The Accountability Control Objective as it relates to auditing 
leads to the following control objective for auditing: 
 
    "A trusted computer system must provide authorized personnel 
     with the ability to audit any action that can potentially  
     cause access to, generation of, or effect the release 
     of classified or sensitive information.  The audit 
     data will be selectively acquired based on the auditing 
     needs of a particular installation and/or application.      
     However, there must be sufficient granularity in the audit  
     data to support tracing the auditable events to a specific  
     individual (or process) who has taken the actions or on     
     whose behalf the actions were taken."(1)   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                3 
 
 
 
5.   OVERVIEW OF AUDITING PRINCIPLES 
 
Audit trails are used to detect and deter penetration of a
computer system and to reveal usage that identifies misuse.  At
the discretion of the auditor, audit trails may be limited to
specific events or may encompass all of the activities on a
system.  Although not required by the TCSEC, it should be
possible for the target of the audit mechanism to be either a
subject or an object.  That is to say, the audit mechanism should
be capable of monitoring every time John accessed the system as
well as every time the nuclear reactor file was accessed; and
likewise every time John accessed the nuclear reactor file. 
 
 
5.1   Purpose of the Audit Mechanism 
 
The audit mechanism of a computer system has five important
security goals.  First, the audit mechanism must "allow the
review of patterns of access to individual objects, access
histories of specific processes and individuals, and the use of
the various protection mechanisms supported by the system and
their effectiveness."(2)  Second, the audit mechanism must allow
discovery of both users' and outsiders' repeated attempts to
bypass the protection mechanisms.  Third, the audit mechanism
must allow discovery of any use of privileges that may occur when
a user assumes a functionality with privileges greater than his
or her own, i.e., programmer to administrator.  In this case
there may be no bypass of security controls but nevertheless a
violation is made possible.  Fourth, the audit mechanism must act
as a deterrent against perpetrators' habitual attempts to bypass
the system protection mechanisms.  However, to act as a
deterrent, the perpetrator must be aware of the audit mechanism's
existence and its active use to detect any attempts to bypass
system protection mechanisms.  The fifth goal of the audit
mechanism is to supply "an additional form of user assurance that
attempts to bypass the protection mechanisms are recorded and
discovered."(2)  Even if the attempt to bypass the protection
mechanism is successful, the audit trail will still provide
assurance by its ability to aid in assessing the damage done by
the violation, thus improving the system's ability to control the
damage. 
 
 
5.2.  Users of the Audit Mechanism 
 
"The users of the audit mechanism can be divided into two groups. 
The first group consists of the auditor, who is an individual
with administrative duties, who selects the events to be audited
on the system, sets up the audit flags which enable the recording

                                4



of those events, and analyzes the trail of audit events."(2)  In
some systems the duties of the auditor may be encompassed in the
duties of the system security administrator.  Also, at the lower
classes, the auditor role may be performed by the system
administrator.  This document will refer to the person
responsible for auditing as the system security administrator,
although it is understood that the auditing guidelines may apply
to system administrators and/or system security administrators
and/or a separate auditor in some ADP systems.   
 
"The second group of users of the audit mechanism consists of the
system users themselves; this group includes the administrators,
the operators, the system programmers, and all other users.  They
are considered users of the audit mechanism not only because
they, and their programs, generate audit events,"(2) but because
they must understand that the audit mechanism exists and what
impact it has on them.  This is important because otherwise the
user deterrence and user assurance goals of the audit mechanism
cannot be achieved.    
 
 
5.3  Aspects of Effective Auditing 
 
 
5.3.1.  Identification/Authentication 
 
 Logging in on a system normally requires that a user enter the 
specified form of identification (e.g., login ID, magnetic strip) 
and a password (or some other mechanism) for authentication. 
Whether this information is valid or invalid, the execution of
the login procedure is an auditable event and the identification
entered may be considered to be auditable information.  It is
recommended that authentication information, such as passwords,
not be forwarded to the audit trail.  In the event that the
identification entered is not recognized as being valid, the
system should also omit this information from the audit trail. 
The reason for this is that a user may have entered a password
when the system expected a login ID.  If the information had been
written to the audit trail, it would compromise the password and
the security of the user. 
 
There are, however, environments where the risk involved in 
recording invalid identification information is reduced.  In
systems that support formatted terminals, the likelihood of
password entry in the identification field is markedly reduced,
hence the recording of identification information would pose no
major threat.  The benefit of recording the identification
information is that break-in attempts would be easier to detect
and identifying the perpetrator would also be assisted.  The 

                                 5



information gathered here may be necessary for any legal 
prosecution that may follow a security  violation.    
 
 
5.3.2  Administrative 
 
All systems rated at class C2 or higher shall have audit 
capabilities and personnel designated as responsible for the
audit procedures.  For the C2 and B1 classes, the duties of the
system operators could encompass all functions including those of
the auditor.  Starting at the B2 class, there is a requirement
for the TCB to support separate operator and administrator
functions.  In addition, at the B3 class and above, there is a
requirement to identify the system security administrator
functions.  When one assumes the system security administrator
role on the system, it shall be after taking distinct auditable
action, e.g., login procedure.  When one with the privilege of
assuming the role is on the system, the act of assuming that role
shall also be an auditable event. 
 
 
5.3.3   System Design 
  
The system design should include a mechanism to invoke the audit 
function at the request of the system security administrator.  A 
mechanism should also be included to determine if the event is to
be selected for inclusion as an audit trail entry.  If
pre-selection of events is not implemented, then all auditable
events should be forwarded to the audit trail.  The Criteria
requirement for the administrator to be able to select events
based on user identity and/or object security classification must
still be able to be satisfied.  This requirement can be met by
allowing post-selection of events through the use of queries. 
Whatever reduction tool is used to analyze the audit trail shall
be provided by the vendor.  
 
 
5.4   Security of the Audit 
 
Audit trail software, as well as the audit trail itself, should
be protected by the Trusted Computing Base and should be subject
to strict access controls.  The security requirements of the
audit mechanism are the following: 
 
(1)  The event recording mechanism shall be part of the TCB and  
     shall be protected from unauthorized modification or        
     circumvention. 
 
(2)  The audit trail itself shall be protected by the TCB from   

                                 6



     unauthorized access (i.e., only the audit personnel may     
     access the audit trail).  The audit trail shall also be     
     protected from unauthorized modification.  
 
(3)  The audit-event enabling/disabling mechanism shall be part  
     of the TCB and shall remain inaccessible to the unauthorized 
     users.(2)  
 
At a minimum, the data on the audit trail should be considered to
be sensitive, and the audit trail itself shall be considered to
be as sensitive as the most sensitive data contained in the
system. 
 
When the medium containing the audit trail is physically removed 
from the ADP system, the medium should be accorded the physical 
protection required for the highest sensitivity level of data 
contained in the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 7 
 
 

6.   MEETING THE CRITERIA REQUIREMENTS 
 
This section of the guideline will discuss the audit requirements
in the Criteria and will present a number of additional 
recommendations.  There are four levels of audit requirements. 
The first level is at the C2 Criteria class and the requirements 
continue evolving through the B3 Criteria class.   At each of
these levels, the guideline will list some of the events which
should be auditable, what information should be on the audit
trail, and on what basis events may be selected to be audited. 
All of the requirements will be prefaced by the word "shall," and
any additional recommendations will be prefaced by the word
"should." 
 
 
6.1   The C2 Audit Requirement 
 
6.1.1   Auditable Events 
  
The following events shall be subject to audit at the C2 class:  
 
   * Use of identification and authentication mechanisms 
 
   * Introduction of objects into a user's address space  
 
   * Deletion of objects from a user's address space 
 
   * Actions taken by computer operators and system              
     administrators and/or system security administrators    
 
   * All security-relevant events (as defined in Section 5 of    
     this guideline) 

   * Production of printed output 
 
6.1.2   Auditable Information 
 
The following information shall be recorded on the audit trail at
the C2 class:  
 
   * Date and time of the event 
 
   * The unique identifier on whose behalf the subject generating 
     the event was operating 
 
   * Type of event 
 
   * Success or failure of the event 
 

                                8



   * Origin of the request (e.g., terminal ID) for               
     identification/authentication events 
  
   * Name of object introduced, accessed, or deleted from a      
    user's address space 
 
   * Description of modifications made by the system             
     administrator to the user/system security databases   
 
 
6.1.3   Audit Basis 
 
At the C2 level, the ADP System Administrator shall be able to
audit based on individual identity. 
 
The ADP System Administrator should also be able to audit based
on object identity. 
 
 
6.2   The B1 Audit Requirement 
 
6.2.1   Auditable Events 
 
The Criteria specifically adds the following to the list of
events that shall be auditable at the B1 class: 
 
   * Any override of human readable output markings (including   
     overwrite of sensitivity label markings and the turning off 
     of labelling capabilities) on paged, hard-copy output       
   devices 
 
   * Change of designation (single-level to/from multi-level) of 
     any communication channel or I/O device 
 
   * Change of sensitivity level(s) associated with a            
   single-level communication channel or I/O device 
 
   * Change of range designation of any multi-level communication 
     channel or I/O device  
 
 
6.2.2   Auditable Information 
 
The Criteria specifically adds the following to the list of 
information that shall be recorded on the audit trail at the B1  
class: 
 
   * Security level of the object 
 
 
                                 9 



The following information should also be recorded on the audit
trail at the B1 class: 
 
   * Subject sensitivity level  
 
 
6.2.3   Audit Basis 
  
In addition to previous selection criteria, at the B1 level the 
Criteria specifically requires that the ADP System Administrator 
shall be able to audit based on individual identity and/or object
security level. 
 
 
6.3   The B2 Audit Requirement 
 
6.3.1   Auditable Events 
 
The Criteria specifically adds the following to the list of
events that shall be auditable at the B2 class: 
 
   * Events that may exercise covert storage channels  
 
6.3.2   Auditable Information 
  
No new requirements have been added at the B2 class. 
 
 
6.3.3   Audit Basis 
 
In addition to previous selection criteria, at the B2 level the 
Criteria specifically requires that "the TCB shall be able to
audit the identified events that may be used in the exploitation
of covert storage channels."  The Trusted Computing Base shall
audit covert storage channels that exceed ten bits per second.(1) 

The Trusted Computing Base should also provide the capability to 
audit the use of covert storage mechanisms with bandwidths that
may exceed a rate of one bit in ten seconds.  
 
  
6.4   The B3 Audit Requirement 
  
6.4.1   Auditable Events 
  
The Criteria specifically adds the following to the list of
events that shall be auditable at the B3 class: 
 
   * Events that may indicate an imminent violation of the 

                                10

     

     system's security policy (e.g., exercise covert timing      
     channels) 
 
  
6.4.2   Auditable Information 
 
No new requirements have been added at the B3 class. 
 
 
6.4.3   Audit Basis 
 
In addition to previous selection criteria, at the B3 level the  
Criteria specifically requires that "the TCB shall contain a 
mechanism that is able to monitor the occurrence or accumulation
of security auditable events that may indicate an imminent
violation of security policy.  This mechanism shall be able to
immediately notify the system security administrator when
thresholds are exceeded and, if the occurrence or accumulation of
these security-relevant events continues, the system shall take
the least disruptive action to terminate the event."(1)     
 
Events that would indicate an imminent security violation would 
include events that utilize covert timing channels that may
exceed a rate of ten bits per second and any repeated
unsuccessful login attempts.   
 
Being able to immediately notify the system security
administrator when thresholds are exceeded means that the
mechanism shall be able to recognize, report, and respond to a
violation of the security policy more rapidly than required at
lower levels of the Criteria, which usually only requires the
System Security Administrator to review an audit trail at some
time after the event.  Notification of the violation "should be
at the same priority as any other TCB message to an operator."(5) 
 
"If the occurrence or accumulation of these security-relevant
events continues, the system shall take the least disruptive
action to terminate the event."(1)  These actions may include
locking the terminal of the user who is causing the event or
terminating the suspect's process(es).  In general, the least
disruptive action is application dependent and there is no
requirement to demonstrate that the action is the least
disruptive of all possible actions.  Any action which terminates
the event is acceptable, but halting the system should be the
last resort.   
 
 



                                11



7.5   The A1 Audit Requirement 
 
7.5.1   Auditable Events 
 
No new requirements have been added at the A1 class. 
 
 
7.5.2   Auditable Information 
 
No new requirements have been added at the A1 class. 
 
 
7.5.3   Audit Basis 
 
No new requirements have been added at the A1 class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 






















                                12 
 


7.   POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION METHODS 
 
The techniques for implementing the audit requirements will vary 
from system to system depending upon the characteristics of the 
software, firmware, and hardware involved and any optional
features that are to be available.  Technologically advanced
techniques that are available should be used to the best
advantage in the system design to provide the requisite security
as well as cost-effectiveness and performance.  
 
 
7.1   Pre/Post Selection of Auditable Events 
 
There is a requirement at classes C2 and above that all security-
relevant events be auditable.  However, these events may or may
not always be recorded on the audit trail.  Options that may be 
exercised in selecting which events should be audited include a
pre-selection feature and a post-selection feature.  A system may
choose to implement both options, a pre-selection option only, or
a post-selection option only.  
 
If a system developer chooses not to implement a general pre/post
selection option, there is still a requirement to allow the 
administrator to selectively audit the actions of specified users
for all Criteria classes.  Starting at the B1 class, the 
administrator shall also be able to audit based on object
security level. 
 
There should be options to allow selection by either individuals
or groups of users.  For example, the administrator may select
events related to a specified individual or select events related
to individuals included in a specified group.  Also, the
administrator may specify that events related to the audit file
be selected or, at classes B1 and above, that accesses to objects
with a given sensitivity level, such as Top Secret, be selected. 
 
 
7.1.1   Pre-Selection 
 
For each auditable event the TCB should contain a mechanism to 
indicate if the event is to be recorded on the audit trail.  The 
system security administrator or designee shall be the only
person authorized to select the events to be recorded. 
Pre-selection may be by user(s) identity, and at the B1 class and
above, pre-selection may also be possible by object security
level.  Although the system security administrator shall be
authorized to select which events are to be recorded, the system
security administrator should not be able to exclude himself from
being audited. 
 
                                13



Although it would not be recommended, the system security  
administrator may have the capability to select that no events be
recorded regardless of the Criteria requirements.  The intention 
here is to provide flexibility.  The purpose of designing audit 
features into a system is not to impose the Criteria on users
that may not want it, but merely to provide the capability to
implement the requirements. 
 
A disadvantage of pre-selection is that it is very hard to
predict what events may be of security-relevant interest at a
future date.  There is always the possibility that events not
pre-selected could one day become security-relevant, and the
potential loss from not auditing these events would be impossible
to determine. 
 
The advantage of pre-selection could possibly be better
performance as a result of not auditing all the events on the
system. 
 
 
7.1.2   Post-Selection 
 
If the post-selection option to select only specified events from
an existing audit trail is implemented, again, only authorized 
personnel shall be able to make this selection.  Inclusion of
this option requires that the system should have trusted
facilities (as described in section 9.1) to accept
query/retrieval requests, to expand any compressed data, and to
output the requested data. 
 
The main advantage of post-selection is that information that may
prove useful in the future is already recorded on an audit trail
and may be queried at any time. 
 
The disadvantage involved in post-selection could possibly be 
degraded performance due to the writing and storing of what could
possibly be a very large audit trail. 
 
 
7.2   Data Compression 

"Since a system that selects all events to be audited may
generate a large amount of data, it may be necessary to encode
the data to conserve space and minimize the processor time
required" to record the audit records.(3)  If the audit trail is
encoded, a complementary mechanism must be included to decode the
data when required.  The decoding of the audit trail may be done
as a preprocess before the audit records are accessed by the
database or as a postprocess after a relevant record has been 

                                14



found.  Such decoding is necessary to present the data in an 
understandable form both at the administrators terminal and on
batch reports.  The cost of compressing the audit trail would be
the time required for the compression and expansion processes. 
The benefit of compressing data is the savings in storage and the
savings in time to write the records to the audit trail.  
 
 
7.3   Multiple Audit Trails 
 
All events included on the audit trail may be written as part of
the same audit trail, but some systems may prefer to have several
distinct audit trails, e.g., one would be for "user" events, one
for "operator" events, and one for "system security
administrator" events.  This would result in several smaller
trails for subsequent analysis.  In some cases, however, it may
be necessary to combine the information from the trails when
questionable events occur in order to obtain a composite of the
sequence of events as they occurred.  In cases where there are
multiple audit trails, it is preferred that there be some
accurate, or at least synchronized, time stamps across the
multiple logs.    
 
Although the preference for several distinct audit trails may be 
present, it is important to note that it is often more useful
that the TCB be able to present all audit data as one
comprehensive audit trail. 
 
 
7.4   Physical Storage 
 
A factor to consider in the selection of the medium to be used
for the audit trail would be the expected usage of the system. 
The I/O volume for a system with few users executing few
applications would be quite different from that of a large system
with a multitude of users performing a variety of applications. 
In any case, however, the system should notify the system
operator or administrator when the audit trail medium is
approaching its storage capacity.  Adequate advance notification
to the operator is especially necessary if human intervention is
required.   
 
If the audit trail storage medium is saturated before it is 
replaced, the operating system shall detect this and take some 
appropriate action such as: 
 
1.  Notifying the operator that the medium is "full" and action  
    is necessary.  The system should then stop and require       
    rebooting.  Although a valid option, this action creates a   

                                15



    severe threat of denial-of-service attacks. 
 
2.  Storing the current audit records on a temporary medium with 
    the intention of later migration to the normal operational   
    medium, thus allowing auditing to continue.  This temporary  
    storage medium should be afforded the same protection as the 
    regular audit storage medium in order to prevent any attempts 
    to tamper with it. 
 
3.  Delaying input of new actions and/or slowing down current    
    operations to prevent any action that requires use of the    
    audit mechanism. 
 
4.  Stopping until the administrative personnel make more space  
    available for writing audit records.    
 
5.  Stopping auditing entirely as a result of a decision by the  
    system security administrator. 
 
 
Any action that is taken in response to storage overflow shall be 
audited.  There is, however, a case in which the action taken may
not be audited that deserves mention.  It is possible to have the
system security administrator's decisions embedded in the system 
logic.  Such pre-programmed choices, embedded in the system
logic, may be triggered automatically and this action may not be
audited. 
 
Still another consideration is the speed at which the medium 
operates.  It should be able to accommodate the "worst case" 
condition such as when there are a large number of users on the 
system and all auditable events are to be recorded.  This worst
case rate should be estimated during the system design phase and
(when possible) suitable hardware should be selected for this
purpose. 
 
Regardless of how the system handles audit trail overflow, there 
must be a way to archive all of the audit data.  
 
 
7.5   Write-Once Device 
 
For the lower Criteria classes (e.g., C2, B1) the audit trail may
be the major tool used in detecting security compromises. 
Implicit in this is that the audit resources should provide the
maximum protection possible.  One technique that may be employed
to protect the audit trail is to record it on a mechanism
designed to be a write-only device.  Other choices would be to
set the designated device to write-once mode by disabling the 

                                16



read mechanism.  This method could prevent an attacker from
erasing or modifying the data already written on the audit trail
because the attacker will not be able to go back and read or find
the data that he or she wishes to modify.   

If a hardware device is available that permits only the writing
of data on a medium, modification of data already recorded would
be quite difficult.  Spurious messages could be written, but to
locate and modify an already recorded message would be difficult. 
Use of a write-once device does not prevent a penetrator from
modifying audit resources in memory, including any buffers, in
the current audit trail. 
 
If a write-once device is used to record the audit trail, the
medium can later be switched to a compatible read device to allow 
authorized personnel to analyze the information on the audit
trail in order to detect any attempts to penetrate the system. 
If a penetrator modified the audit software to prevent writing
records on the audit trail, the absence of data during an
extended period of time would indicate a possible security
compromise.  The disadvantage of using a write-once device is
that it necessitates a delay before the audit trail is available
for analysis by the administrator.  This may be offset by
allowing the system security administrator to review the audit
trail in real-time by getting copies of all audit records on
their way to the device. 
 
 
7.6   Forwarding Audit Data 
 
If the facilities are available, another method of protecting the
audit trail would be to forward it to a dedicated processor.  The
audit trail should then be more readily available for analysis by
the system security administrator.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                17 
 
 

8.  OTHER TOPICS 
 
 
8.1   Audit Data Reduction 
 
Depending upon the amount of activity on a system and the audit 
selection process used, the audit trail size may vary.  It is a
safe assumption though, that the audit trail would grow to sizes
that would necessitate some form of audit data reduction.  The
data reduction tool would most likely be a batch program that
would interface to the system security administrator.  This batch
run could be a combination of database query language and a
report generator with the input being a standardized audit file. 
 
Although they are not necessarily part of the TCB, the audit 
reduction tools should be maintained under the same configuration
control system as the remainder of the system. 
 
 
8.2  Availability of Audit Data 
 
In standard data processing, audit information is recorded as it 
occurs.  Although most information is not required to be
immediately available for real-time analysis, the system security
administrator should have the capability to retreive audit
information within minutes of its recording.  The delay between
recording audit information and making it available for analysis
should be minimal, in the range of several minutes.   
 
For events which do require immediate attention, at the B3 class
and above, an alert shall be sent out to the system security 
administrator.  In systems that store the audit trail in a
buffer, the system security administrator should have the
capability to cause the buffer to be written out.  Regarding
real-time alarms, where they are sent is system dependent.   
 
 
8.3  Audit Data Retention 
 
The exact period of time required for retaining the audit trail  
is site dependent and should be documented in the site's
operating procedures manual.  When trying to arrive at the
optimum time for audit trail retention, any time restrictions on
the storage medium should be considered.  The storage medium used
must be able to reliably retain the audit data for the amount of
time required by the site.     
 
The audit trail should be reviewed at least once a week.  It is
very possible that once a week may be too long to wait to review 

                                18



the audit trail.  Depending on the amount of audit data expected 
by the system, this parameter should be adjusted accordingly. 
The recommended time in between audit trail reviews should be
documented in the Trusted Facility Manual.      
 
 
8.4  Testing 
 
The audit resources, along with all other resources protected by
the TCB, have increasing assurance requirements at each higher
Criteria class.  For the lower classes, an audit trail would be a
major factor in detecting penetration attempts.  Unfortunately,
at these lower classes, the audit resources are more susceptible
to penetration and corruption.  "The TCB must provide some
assurance that the data will still be there when the
administrator tries to use it."(3)  The testing requirement
recognizes the vulnerability of the audit trail, and starting
with the C2 class, shall include a search for obvious flaws that
would corrupt or destroy the audit trail.  If the audit trail is
corrupted or destroyed, the existence of such flaws indicates
that the system can be penetrated.  Testing should also be
performed to uncover any ways of circumventing the audit
mechanisms.  The "flaws found in testing may be neutralized in 
any of a number of ways.  One way available to the system
designer is to audit all uses of the mechanism in which the flaw
is found and to log such events."(3)  An attempt should be made
to remove the flaw.   
 
At class B2 and above, it is required that all detected flaws
shall be corrected or else a lower rating will be given.  If
during testing the audit trail appears valid, analysis of this
data can verify that it does or does not accurately reflect the
events that should be included on the audit trail.  Even though
system assurances may increase at the higher classes, the audit
trail is still an effective tool during the testing phase as well
as operationally in detecting actual or potential security
compromises. 
 
 
8.5  Documentation  
 
Starting at the C2 class, documentation concerning the audit 
requirements shall be contained in the Trusted Facility Manual.  
The Trusted Facility Manual shall explain the procedures to
record, examine, and maintain audit files.  It shall detail the
audit record structure for each type of audit event, and should
include what each field is and what the size of the field is. 
 
The Trusted Facility Manual shall also include a complete  

                                19



description of the audit mechanism interface, how it should be
used, its default settings, cautions about the trade-offs
involved in using various configurations and capabilities, and
how to set up and run the system such that the audit data is 
afforded appropriate protection. 
 
If audit events can be pre- or post-selected, the manual should
also describe the tools and mechanisms available and how they are
to be used. 
 
 
8.6  Unavoidable Security Risks 
 
There are certain risks contained in the audit process that exist
simply because there is no way to prevent these events from ever 
occurring.  Because there are certain unpredictable factors  
involved in auditing, i.e., man, nature, etc., the audit
mechanism may never be one hundred per cent reliable.  Preventive
measures may be taken to minimize the likelihood of any of these
factors adversely affecting the security provided by the audit
mechanism, but no audit mechanism will ever be risk free.      
 
 
8.6.1   Auditing Administrators/Insider Threat 
 
Even with auditing mechanisms in place to detect and deter
security violations, the threat of the perpetrator actually being
the system security administrator or someone involved with the
system security design will always be present.  It is quite
possible that the system security administrator of a secure
system could stop the auditing of activities while entering the
system and corrupting files for personal benefit.  These
authorized personnel, who may also have access to identification
and authentication information, could also choose to enter the
system disguised as another user in order to commit crimes under
a false identity.  
    
Management should be aware of this risk and should be certain to 
exercise discretion when selecting the system security 
administrator.  The person who is to be selected for a trusted 
position, such as the system security administrator, should be 
subject to a background check before being granted the privileges
that could one day be used against the employer.   
 
The system security administrator could also be watched to ensure
that there are no unexplained variances in normal duties.  Any 
deviation from the norm of operations may indicate that a
violation of security has occurred or is about to occur. 
 

                                20



An additional security measure to control this insider threat is
to ensure that the system administrator and the person
responsible for the audit are two different people.  "The
separation of the auditor's functions, databases, and access
privileges from those of the system administrator is an important
application of the separation of privilege and least privilege 
principles.  Should such a separation not be performed, and
should the administrator be allowed to undertake auditor
functions or vice-versa, the entire security function would
become the responsibility of a single, unaccountable
individual."(2) 
 
Another alternative may be to employ separate auditor roles. 
Such a situation may give one person the authority to turn off
the audit mechanism, while another person may have the authority
to turn it back on.  In this case no individual would be able to
turn off the audit mechanism, compromise the system, and then
turn it back on. 
 
 
8.6.2   Data Loss 
  
Although the audit software and hardware are reliable security  
mechanisms, they are not infallible.  They, like the rest of the 
system, are dependent upon constant supplies of power and are  
readily subject to interruption due to mechanical or power
failures.  Their failure can cause the loss or destruction of
valuable audit data.  The system security administrator should be
aware of this risk and should establish some procedure that would
ensure that the audit trail is preserved somewhere.  The system
security administrator should duplicate the audit trail on a
removable medium at certain points in time to minimize the data
loss in the event of a system failure.  The Trusted Facility
Manual should include what the possibilities and nature of loss
exposure are, and how the data may be recovered in the event that
a catastrophe does occur.  
 
If a mechanical or power failure occurs, the system security 
administrator should ensure that audit mechanisms still function 
properly after system recovery.  For example, any auditing
mechanism options pre-selected before the system malfunction must
still be the ones in operation after the system recovery.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
                                21 
 
 
 
9.  AUDIT SUMMARY 
 
 
For classes C2 and above, it is required that the TCB "be able to
create, maintain, and protect from modification or unauthorized 
access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects
it protects."(1)  The audit trail plays a key role in performing
damage assessment in the case of a corrupted system.   
 
The audit trail shall keep track of all security-relevant events 
such as the use of identification and authentication mechanisms, 
introduction of objects into a user's address space, deletion of 
objects from the system, system administrator actions, and any
other events that attempt to violate the security policy of the
system.  The option should exist that either all activities be
audited or that the system security administrator select the
events to be audited.  If it is decided that all activities
should be audited, there are overhead factors to be considered. 
The storage space needed for a total audit would generally
require more operator maintenance to prevent any loss of data and
to provide adequate protection.  A requirement exists that
authorized personnel shall be able to read all events recorded on
the audit trail.  Analysis of the total audit trail would be both
a difficult and time-consuming task for the administrator.  Thus,
a selection option is required which may be either a
pre-selection or post-selection option.   
 
The audit trail information should be sufficient to reconstruct a
complete sequence of security-relevant events and processes for a
system.  To do this, the audit trail shall contain the following 
information:  date and time of the event, user, type of event, 
success or failure of the event, the origin of the request, the
name of the object introduced into the user's address space,
accessed, or deleted from the storage system, and at the B1 class
and above, the sensitivity determination of the object. 
 
It should be remembered that the audit trail shall be included in
the Trusted Computing Base and shall be accorded the same
protection as the TCB.  The audit trail shall be subject to
strict access controls. 
 
An effective audit trail is necessary in order to detect and 
evaluate hostile attacks on a system.    
 
 
 
 
 
 

                                22 



GLOSSARY

Administrator - Any one of a group of personnel assigned to 
supervise all or a portion of an ADP system.   
 
Archive - To file or store records off-line. 
 
Audit - To conduct the independent review and examination of 
system records and activities. 
 
Auditor - An authorized individual with administrative duties,
whose duties include selecting the events to be audited on the
system, setting up the audit flags which enable the recording of
those events, and analyzing the trail of audit events.(2) 
 
Audit Mechanism - The device used to collect, review, and/or
examine system activities. 
 
Audit Trail - A set of records that collectively provide
documentary evidence of processing used to aid in tracing from
original transactions forward to related records and reports,
and/or backwards from records and reports to their component
source transactions.(1) 
 
Auditable Event - Any event that can be selected for inclusion in
the audit trail.  These events should include, in addition to 
security-relevant events, events taken to recover the system
after failure and any events that might prove to be
security-relevant at a later time.  
 
Authenticated User - A user who has accessed an ADP system with a
valid identifier and authentication combination.  
 
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) System - An assembly of computer 
hardware, firmware, and software configured for the purpose of 
classifying, sorting, calculating, computing, summarizing, 
transmitting and receiving, storing, and retrieving data with a 
minimum of human intervention.(1) 
 
Category - A grouping of classified or unclassified sensitive 
information, to which an additional restrictive label is applied 
(e.g., proprietary, compartmented information) to signify that 
personnel are granted access to the information only if they have
formal approval or other appropriate authorization.(4)  
 
Covert Channel - A communication channel that allows a process to 
transfer information in a manner that violates the system's
security policy.(1) 
 

                                23 
 
 

Covert Storage Channel - A covert channel that involves the
direct or indirect writing of a storage location by one process
and the direct or indirect reading of the storage location by
another process.  Covert storage channels typically involve a
finite resource (e.g., sectors on a disk) that is shared by two
subjects at different security levels.(1) 
 
Covert Timing Channel - A covert channel in which one process 
signals information to another by modulating its own use of
system resources (e.g., CPU time) in such a way that this
manipulation affects the real response time observed by the
second process.(1) 
 
Flaw - An error of commission, omission or oversight in a system 
that allows protection mechanisms to be bypassed.(1) 
 
Object - A passive entity that contains or receives information. 
Access to an object potentially implies access to the information
it contains.  Examples of objects are:  records, blocks, pages, 
segments, files, directories, directory trees and programs, as
well as bits, bytes, words, fields, processors, video displays, 
keyboards, clocks, printers, network nodes, etc.(1) 
 
Post-Selection - Selection, by authorized personnel, of specified
events that had been recorded on the audit trail. 
 
Pre-Selection - Selection, by authorized personnel, of the
auditable events that are to be recorded on the audit trail. 
 
Security Level - The combination of a hierarchical classification
and a set of non-hierarchical categories that represents the 
sensitivity of information.(1) 
 
Security Policy - The set of laws, rules, and practices that 
regulate how an organization manages, protects, and distributes 
sensitive information.(1) 
 
Security-Relevant Event - Any event that attempts to change the  
security state of the system,  (e.g., change discretionary access
controls, change the security level of the subject, change user  
password, etc.).  Also, any event that attempts to violate the  
security policy of the system, (e.g., too many attempts to login,
attempts to violate the mandatory access control limits of a
device, attempts to downgrade a file, etc.).(1) 
 
Sensitive Information - Information that, as determined by a 
competent authority, must be protected because its unauthorized 
disclosure, alteration, loss, or destruction will at least cause 
perceivable damage to someone or something.(1) 
 
                                24



Subject - An active entity, generally in the form of a person,  
process, or device that causes information to flow among objects
or changes the system state.  Technically, a process/domain
pair.(1) 
 
Subject Sensitivity Level - The sensitivity level of the objects
to which the subject has both read and write access.  A subject's
sensitivity level must always be less than or equal to the
clearance of the user the subject is associated with.(4) 
 
System Security Administrator - The person responsible for the 
security of an Automated Information System and having the
authority to enforce the security safeguards on all others who
have access to the Automated Information System.(4)  
 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) - The totality of protection
mechanisms within a computer system -- including hardware,
firmware, and software -- the combination of which is responsible
for enforcing a security policy.  A TCB consists of one or more
components that together enforce a unified security policy over a
product or system.  The ability of a TCB to correctly enforce a
security policy depends solely on the mechanisms within the TCB
and on the correct input by system administrative personnel of
parameters (e.g., a user's clearance) related to the security
policy.(1) 
 
User - Any person who interacts directly with a computer
system.(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 















                                25 



REFERENCES 
 
 
1.    National Computer Security Center, DoD Trusted Computer    
      System Evaluation Criteria, DoD, DoD 5200.28-STD, 1985. 
 
2.    Gligor, Virgil D., "Guidelines for Trusted Facility        
      Management and Audit," University of Maryland, 1985. 
 
3.    Brown, Leonard R., "Guidelines for Audit Log Mechanisms in 
      Secure Computer Systems," Technical Report                 
      TR-0086A(2770-29)-1, The Aerospace Corporation, 1986. 
 
4.    Subcommittee on Automated Information System Security,     
      Working Group #3, "Dictionary of Computer Security         
      Terminology," 23 November 1986. 
  
5.    National Computer Security Center, Criterion               
      Interpretation, Report No. C1-C1-02-87, 1987. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 







                                26





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